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Abstract
This research is aimed at exploring 
and understanding important issues 
concerning the formation process of 
international  strategic  alliances  of 
Thai financial enterprises (TFEs). 
International alliance strategies have 
been deployed as an important device 
to stabilise and internationalise a
number of TFES. The main context of 
the research involves the formation 
stage of international alliances of Thai 
financial enterprises, comprising 
motives, criteria, and the timing of 
alliance development.  The  motives 
and underlying reasons stimulating 
international         alliances,         major
considerations in foreign partner 
selection, and the strategic timing of 
alliance arrangements lie at the heart 
of the research. Moreover, co-operative 
the performance of the alliances also 
supplements the above issues. In this 
study, questionnaire surveys and 
interview were arranged with a number 
of TFEs’ executives throughout the 
industry who were involved in the 
formation process of the international 
alliances. The rich information from the 
interviews enriches the database of the 
statistical analysis from the surveys and 
offers a comprehensive picture of 
international alliances of Thai financial 
enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of cross-border 
relationships between Thai financial 
enterprises (TFEs) and foreign partners 
have been established since several 
decades ago. However, the cross-border 
relationships remained new to TFEs 
and the Thai economy as the degree of 
the co-operation was limited at the 
beginning stage. Further, Thailand, 
particularly the financial industry, has 
only recently been significantly 
exposed to foreign competition. This is 
due to the forces from the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trades 
(GATT) and other international trade 
agreements. The protective regulations 
to local markets and industries have 
been relaxed and lifted. Foreigners have 
started to play a more important part in 
the Thai economy. Cross-border 
alliances between Thai and foreign 
firms have been widely employed in 
order to make a trade off between the 
risks and returns from investment as 
well as achieving mutual benefits for 
both local and foreign firms. This 
phenomenon has been clearly seen in 
the financial industry as the industry 
has become much more 
internationalised than other business 
sectors.
This study then aims to explore the 
critical issues of international strategic 
alliances of Thai financial enterprises. 
This is because international strategic 
alliances  are  currently  considered  one
of the most popular, attractive, and
effective global strategies in order to
deal efficiently with the complex and
intense global environment. In addition,
the researcher needs to investigate an
industry which is dynamically growing
and rapidly changing. Such an industry
is also in the period of transformation
from a total domestic focus to a
complete global perspective,
represented by the Thai financial
industry. Thus, the main issue of the
study which is centred on the formation
process of international strategic
alliances (ISAs) of Thai financial
enterprises (TFEs) is intriguing enough
to be investigated in-depth.
The    formation    process    of
international alliances of TFEs
The major content of this research
focuses on the formation process of the
international strategic alliances of Thai
Financial Enterprises (TFEs). Thai
financial enterprises in this study
involves finance companies, consisting
of finance, securities, and
finance&securities companies in
Thailand. This is because the group of
companies was in the higher stage of
internationalisation and more exposed
to the foreign environment, compared
with other sorts of financial firms. In
addition, the arrangement of
international alliances had been
increasingly important and seemed like
“a must” for TFEs.
This study investigated the
international alliances of TFEs, which
had been arranged up to the end of
1996. The period was considered to be
the introductory and growth period of
the Thai financial industry, in respect of
which most TFEs still enjoyed the
prosperity of high economic returns on
investment. The results of this study
represented the formulation and
implementation of international alliance
strategy in a dynamically changing
industry, which was in the
transformation period from total
domestic to international operations.
TFEs’ international alliances
focused on securities business co-
operations. The major areas of co-
operation included primary market
collaboration, secondary market
collaboration, and research technique
collaboration. The primary market
collaboration involved joint
management and operations in
corporate finance deals and investment
banking activities. The secondary
market collaboration encompassed joint
brokerage operations, securities trading
order transfers, as well as securities
marketing operations. The research
collaboration involved co-operation in
research techniques, skills, information,
and training and development of
research staff. Major nationalities of
TFEs’ foreign partners were European,
American, Chinese in Hong Kong,
Japanese, and Singaporean respectively.
TFEs’ International Alliance
Motives
Regarding the formation stage of
TFEs’ cross-border alliances, TFEs
seemed to pay significant attention to
all major aspects of motives, including
defensive and offensive approaches as
well as market and resource-oriented, in
alliance development. Both defensive
and offensive approaches were of major
concern to TFEs as their alliances were
aimed at defending themselves from
external threats and uncertainties as
well as further developing themselves
to become more competent. Various
factors influencing the strategic motives
of TFEs were identified as external and
internal factors as follows (See figure
1).
With regard to external factors, the
overall condition of emerging countries,
which was combined between major
uncertainties and business
opportunities, influenced TFEs’
thinking process concerning their
alliance motives. Economic conditions
in emerging countries, including
Thailand, were considered to be highly
unstable. In particular, in the Thai
financial industry, there were
uncertainties in market demand and
client structure. The demand was
volatile and unpredictable. The client
structure and patterns of customer
behaviour were rapidly changing as
they  were  affected  by variables within
the industry and outside the country.
The industry factor primarily involved
customers who were increasingly
educated and demanding. Another
factor was the development process of
the Thai financial industry itself which
was aimed at being more efficient,
competitive, and responsive to
customers. The participation and
manipulation from foreign partners
also brought in new technology, skills,
capital, and the highly potential groups
of customers. All these factors led to
changes and uncertainties in the
industry.
Meanwhile, the dramatic changes
in economic conditions also fostered
great business opportunities for TFEs.
This was due to the high potential for
business growth in the industry, at the
growth period, resulting from its
abundant resources and
infrastructures, supportive regulations
and actions of the government, and
various inflows of foreign resources
and capital. All of these encouraged
TFEs to think in optimistic and
opportunistic ways. Moreover, the
prosperous performance of the whole
industry during the past several years,
prior to their alliance establishment,
made them more aggressive in strategic
formulation. This was due to the Thai
financial industry that had long been in
the growth period and enjoyed easy-to-
earn money before arranging their
alliances. Hence, TFEs’ cross-border
alliances were deployed as a means to
capture business opportunities, to
support their development, and to
promote their market competitive
positions.
TFEs’ motives for cross-border
alliances were also driven by
competitive conditions of the industry.
The competition was highly intensified,
as there were a number of participants
in the industry. Although there had long
been a high growth rate in the industry,
TFEs, particularly small and less
powerful ones, struggled for survival in
the high competition. In addition, the
number of potential foreign rivals,
which were relatively more powerful
than TFEs, also threatened and
multiplied the degree of competitive
uncertainties in the Thai financial
industry. The regulations from the
public authorities requiring TFEs to
maintain minimum market share in the
stock market also significantly
intensified the competition. Recently,
there had been alternative investments,
apart from the formal and conventional
stock market (SET), such as debt
market, over-the-counter market, and
the under-construction derivative
market. TFEs then needed to defend
their market position in the highly
competitive industry via cross-border
partnerships.
Direct forces from international
and globalisation factors influenced
the motives of TFEs alliances. The
widespread imperialism from the
western countries urged TFEs to be
aware of their future positions in the
industry. As the Thai financial industry
was being forced to be more liberalised,
the domination of foreign firms over
TFEs was increasing. Many TFEs
turned potential rivals to friendly
partners in order to defend themselves
from being acquired. In other words,
they also turned threats to become a
“short-cut” to modernise themselves via
their alliance relationships  (See figure
1).   
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Apart from threats, the
globalisation effects also provided
TFEs with huge opportunities to gain
benefits. It helped bring in foreign
capital, technology, skills, and
information, which the Thai financial
industry seriously lacked. Like other
emerging economies, the local
resources were not adequate to sustain
and further the high growth conditions
of the industry. Foreign capital was
regarded as required resources for
continuing the prosperity of the
economies, particularly in the financial
industry. In this respect, TFEs’
international alliances were aimed at
achieving the necessary resources to
continue and advance their operations.
Major internal factors affecting
the motives of TFEs’ alliances include
the attributes of TFEs’ executives (See
figure 1). The executives were likely to
be aggressive and opportunistic. This
was primarily due to their backgrounds.
In this respect, the executives were
highly educated and considered to be a
privileged class in society. In addition,
they had managed their financial
companies successfully, which had
resulted from both a supportive
economic environment and their
capabilities. They then had high self-
confidence and were likely to pursue
aggressive and innovative strategies,
including cross-border alliances, to
achieve great benefits.
Quite often, many TFEs paid
greater attention to immediate benefits
rather than long-term and sustainable
advantages. To quickly improve their
performance, they tended to concentrate
on brokerage transfer, which provided
short-term immediate cash inflows,
rather than technology and skill
transfer. This also encouraged TFEs to
focus on short-term alliance motives for
achieving immediate resources and
benefits.
Systems, procedures, and structures of
TFEs’ operations, which had not
reached international standards, urged
the firms to seek significant help from
competent partners. As the majority of
TFEs had been prosperous and
developed for only about one decade,
all their operational grounds were not
yet solid and well-prepared. Also, they
needed to restructure their operations in
order to focus more on foreign and
institutional clients. They then had to be
quickly improved and a significant
amount of contributions from partners
would be helpful in this respect.
Various resource constraints of TFEs,
in terms of capital, expertise,
international market networks, and
research information and directions,
were another major factor driving them
to establish alliances. In particular,
TFEs seriously lacked the resources
necessary for developing themselves to
survive and succeed at the international
level. In this respect, TFEs’ local allies,
mostly Thai commercial banks, could
not provide them with such
internationally required resources as the
banks had been only slightly exposed to
international competition. Additionally,
the business of the commercial banks
focused entirely on credit and foreign
exchange businesses which were
different from those of TFEs. Thus, the
required resources could only be
fulfilled via alliances with foreign firms
in the complementary field of business.
Likewise, the nature of TFEs’
core business, which was exposed to
the international financial community
and more internationalized, was also a
major driver. As the securities business,
including brokerage, investment
banking, research, and asset
management seemed to be most
important for TFEs, the firms were
more likely to depend on foreign
brokerage houses. This was because the
securities business became relatively
boundless, compared with the credit
business of commercial banks where
the scope of business was at the
domestic level. Moreover, the credit
business was highly protected and
supported by the government. The Bank
of Thailand also committed itself to be
the last resort provider for the banking
and credit industry. Thus, they did not
need to rely much on foreign partners in
the credit business.
TFEs’ Foreign Partner Selection
Criteria
Regarding the foreign partner
seeking process, TFEs usually sought
their prospective partners via the
connections and recommendations of
their shareholders and executives. In
many cases, TFEs developed cross-
border alliances with their previous
foreign customers.
TFEs emphasised the importance
of the partner selection process and
regarded the process as a critical
success factor in alliances. The criteria
were  directly  influenced  by  the
motives and objectives of alliances
(See figure 2).  In general, TFEs
stressed the importance of criteria
associated with synergy &
complementary competencies, strategic
fit and balance, and operational
cultural compatibility. This could be
derived from TFE’s motives with
respect to the resource-defensive and –
offensive approach. In this respect,
TFEs needed foreign partners
possessing resources, assets, and
business complementary to those of
themselves so as to create the synergy
effects for mutual prosperity. First,
TFEs needed the resources for
defending themselves as well as
handling risks and various operational
problems in order to smoothly continue
their operations in the industry. Second,
the required resources were expected to
be utilised and exchanged to create
synergy for enhancing mutual
development and accomplishing their
higher-level motives.
Likewise, TFEs’ motives
associated with the market-defensive
and -offensive approaches apparently
affected their selection criteria. The
motives focused on preparing TFEs to
handle various uncertainties in order to
defend their market positions as well as
continuously improving themselves to
expand their market scope and
activities. In this respect, TFEs
emphasised longevity, stability, and
mutual understanding and benefits of
the alliances. The longer the alliances,
the greater the continuous improvement
would be. TFEs’ criteria then focused
on compatibility between partners, both
at the strategic and operational level.
This was expected to reduce conflicts of
interest and long-term problems in the
management and operations of the
alliances. Also, long-term co-operation
resulted in better utilisation of foreign
partners’ resources which brought huge
advantages to TFEs.
The uncertainties and dynamic
changes in economic conditions,
particularly in the international
financial market, put pressure on TFEs.
They then must seek foreign partners
who possessed resources and
competencies seriously required by
TFEs in order to quickly utilise them. In
such a changing environment, TFEs
could not afford to build up of the
competencies by themselves due to
time and resource limitations. Thus, the
complementary competencies became
an important criterion. However, inter-
firm collaboration amid the uncertain
situations, especially cross-border ones,
was vulnerable as there were many
uncontrollable variables negatively
affecting the performance of the whole
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co-operation. In this case, cohesion and
harmony between partners were of vital
importance. Hence, the strategic
balance and operational compatibility
become of major concern for selecting
foreign partners.
Again, the characters and
perspectives of TFEs’ executives,
which were rather aggressive and
opportunistic, resulted in more attention
to synergy and complementary
competencies. This was because the
executives were eager to achieve
immediate benefits from the utilisation
of partners’ resources. Such
complementary competencies seemed
to be more important to the TFEs that
focused heavily on short-term and
immediate advantages from their
alliances.
Regulations of TFEs themselves
also affected selection criteria. Many
times, there was a mandate from major
shareholders in directing TFEs to
alliances with the agreed foreign
partners. The alliances were likely to be
developed from personal and business
connections of TFEs’ shareholders. In
some cases, the foreign partners were
referred to by the companies of the
same ownership or holding group with
which TFEs’ shareholders had ever had
relationships. In this respect, the criteria
associated with complementary
resources and assets seemed to be
relaxed as TFEs focused more on
previous relationships and
compatibility.
TFEs’ past experiences of cross-
border alliances in the financial industry
were another important factor. Usually,
TFEs considered the alliance
performance of other TFEs prior to
arranging their own alliances. In
general, TFEs realised that
incompatibility in the management and
operational cultures caused conflicts
between partners due to incoherent
visions and goals between partners. In
addition, the sincerity and long-term
commitment to the Thai financial
market was another controversial issue
between TFEs and their foreign
counterparts. This frequently led to
termination of the collaboration. The
imbalance of negotiating and control
power over the alliances also
significantly resulted in dissatisfaction
and unfair benefit allotment.
In many cases, the determination of
criteria was restricted by the resources
constraints of TFEs. TFEs remained
relatively small and weak, compared
with foreign brokers. There still were a
number of TFEs that were seeking
qualified foreign partners. Thus,
sometimes, TFEs could not set high and
demanding requirements for evaluating
their prospective foreign partners. As a
matter of fact, the requirement and
response from the foreign firms had to
be taken into account. TFEs were also
obliged to provide their partners
advantages in exchange for their
partners’ resources. TFEs then were
likely to consider their own capabilities
before allying themselves with highly
qualified foreign firms. If TFEs became
a burden to their partners, the
collaboration was unlikely to be long-
lasting and the TFEs might be
dominated or occupied later. In this
respect, the criteria were not highly
demanding and strict.
On the other hand, the differences
in pure cultural issues and individual
attributes of foreign partners
insignificantly concerned TFEs in
partner selection. As the globalisation
factor had a strong impact on the Thai
financial industry, such differences
apparently existed and were considered
inevitable. In particular, cross-border
alliances, which involved co-operation
between firms of different countries,
were supposed to have differences.
TFEs must confront and manage them
in constructive ways. In addition, TFEs
figured that the differences in pure
cultural issues, such as nationality,
language, beliefs, and the like, would
not seriously affect the performance of
their co-operation as long as they made
their alliances coherent in strategic and
operational aspects as well as based on
mutual benefits.
TFEs’ International Alliance Timing
Determination
The determination of TFEs’
alliance timing seemed to be strongly
influenced by their motives as the firms
needed to arrange co-operation when
they had the greater chance to
accomplish their goals (See figure 3).
Regarding the resource-offensive and -
defensive approach, TFEs were likely
to arrange their alliance when they were
in a favourable position and had strong
negotiating power. As a result, TFEs
were able to bargain for satisfactory
terms of their co-operative contracts.
They expected to utilise the transferred
resource in order to correct and further
develop their operational capabilities. In
addition, as the TFEs were obliged to
provide their partners with reciprocal
benefits from their alliances, it was
important that the economic
environment in the industry should be
bright and attractive. Also, the overall
competitive conditions of TFEs ought
to be relatively strong so as to be able
to co-operate with the partners and offer
them their needed local advantages.
TFEs also chose the timing when
the overall prospects of the industry
were attractive on account of market -
defensive and -offensive motives. The
firms preferred the timing when the
industry looked prosperous, particularly
in terms of market demand, so as to
attract foreign partners and allow TFEs
to achieve greater advantages from such
an environment. Although the industry
remained volatile, uncertain, and
competitive, this was common for
emerging markets. The bright prospect
of the financial market, in terms of
demand growth, high liquidity, strong
supports from government and from
related industries, was attractive to
foreign counterparts. Importantly, TFEs
could receive huge benefits from
increased investment opportunities for
both foreign and local investors.
Furthermore, they expected to obtain a
large number of foreign investors
transferred from their foreign partners
during the properous period.
In other words, the TFEs’ strong
competitive position was important,
particularly in market competitiveness,
operational efficiency, and staff quality.
As TFEs needed foreign partners’
contributions to facilitate their market
expansion abroad, in return, foreign
partners also expected TFEs to help
them to establish footholds in Thailand.
Thus, the TFEs were required to have
strong local networks and connections
to respond to foreign partners’ needs. In
other words, foreign partners were
usually far more advanced, in terms of
skills and expertise, than TFEs. If TFEs
needed to efficiently improve
themselves from partners’ competence
transfer, they were not supposed to be
weak and inefficient in this respect.
Moreover, a local partner, who had
serious operational and financial
problems, would not attract foreign
partners as they would be regarded as a
burden. Even though some foreign
firms would accept inferior TFEs, the
TFEs must lose a huge amount of
advantages from the alliances.
Similarly, TFEs’ selection criteria
also affected the timing of TFEs’
alliances. In this respect, the firms
needed foreign partners possessing
abundant complementary resources and
having strategic and operational cultural
compatibility. TFEs were likely to
arrange their co-operations when the
relevant conditions, both external and
internal, could attract foreign partners.
TFEs’ alliance at that time must have
advantages to offer their partners.
Meanwhile, they should be ready to
receive and make use of the partners’
resource transfers. The external
environment in the industry must be
supportive and highly potential in
growth. Also, TFEs themselves were
obliged to fulfil foreign partners’
desires, including local market
networks and connections, and local
knowledge. In general, TFEs’ financial
support and business commitment from
their shareholders, commercial banks,
were important attractions of TFEs.
These favorable conditions enabled
TFEs to set and apply the
predetermined criteria to the partner
selection process.
Together with the above
influencing factors, there were direct
reasons explaining TFEs’ alliance
timing selection. The first was the
encouragement from windows of
opportunities, consisting of market and
resource benefits (See figure 3).
A substantial amount of
marketing benefits to be received from
alliance establishment was significantly
related to their alliance timing. As
mentioned earlier, TFEs expected to
make alliances for achieving as much
advantage as possible from their
improved marketing activities, in both
domestic and international markets.
Thus, the firms endeavoured to choose
Figure 3 Strategic timing of Alliances
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to foreign partners. Moreover, TFEs
and their partners were able to combine
their local and regional strengths and
create synergy for attaining mutual
goals. In this respect, TFEs acquired
benefits via foreign partners’ skills,
expertise, information, and international
networks. In return, TFEs must be
capable of offering contributions in
terms of local skills and knowledge,
market sentiment, domestic
infrastructures, and local connections.
The second reason was the
shortage of foreign partners. This was
due to the number of TFEs participating
in the Thai financial industry. TFEs
needed to engage in international
alliances in order to defend and
improve themselves. Meanwhile, there
were a limited number of foreign
financial firms. Therefore, this forced
TFEs to rush their alliance timing.
However, the foreign partner in this
meaning was defined as highly needed
partners. As a matter of fact, there were
numerous foreign financial firms
expressing an intention to make
alliances with TFEs (in the period up to
the end of 1996 prior to the emergence
of the financial crisis). Hence, there was
no serious problem associated with the
shortage of foreign firms, in terms of
quantity. The problem would arise
when the quality of foreign firms was
taken into consideration. Yet, in many
cases, the shortage was not considered
an important force of timing
determination, particularly for TFEs
supported by commercial banks. The
TFEs could seek foreign partners
through the rapport of their
shareholders. Moreover, during the
growth period, TFEs were not in a
difficult situation. If they could not ally
with their required partners or there was
an unfavorable timing which made
them lose significant expected benefits,
they were willing to postpone their
alliance establishment and wait for the
better signal.
The last reason was forces from
external threats. This was not as
crucial as the first reason, windows of
opportunities. This was because TFEs
were more concerned with windows of
opportunity in determining alliance
timing. During the introductory and
growth period, the firms concentrated
on taking advantage rather than risk
averting. Further, as the economic
condition in that period had been
prosperous, all TFEs, even inferior
ones, remained profitable. Thus, not
many TFEs had to hurriedly make
alliances with unfavourable contracts
forced by the external threats. In this
respect, there were only some weak
TFEs, driven by serious threats and
survival reasons, which must arrange
their alliance in an unfavourable timing.
The significant impacts of the current
financial crisis
The recent financial turmoil has
resulted in direct negative effects on the
overall economic conditions of the
country, particularly the financial
industry. The financial position of
Thailand has become extremely weak
and unstable. Also, the entire financial
industry has become increasingly
vulnerable to global financial markets.
Foreign and public confidence in the
industry has deteriorated and the overall
competitiveness of the Thai financial
industry has considerably decreased.
The immediate solution to ease and
tackle the problems is a request for help
from foreigners.
Specifically, the financial and
competitive statuses of TFEs
themselves have been jeopardised by
the crisis. More than half of TFEs have
been merged with each other to become
commercial banks in order to
strengthen their competitive positions
and survive the crisis. In such cases, the
international alliances of these TFEs
have been automatically terminated.
The remaining TFEs, although they
have been proved healthy by the SEC
(Securities and Exchange Commission)
and the Bank of Thailand, are also
badly affected and highly vulnerable.
This is due to the fatal effects of one of
the worst economic crises in Thailand’s
history. Survival and continual stability
of the companies are of prime concern
in this respect.
As already mentioned, most TFEs
are in deep trouble. There is no chance
to ask for help from domestic finance
companies, even from commercial
banks which have been TFEs’ major
shareholders and resource providers.
The remaining TFEs then must turn to
their foreign strategic partners and
request a huge amount of immediate
capital and resources. This is because
TFEs have been required to
immediately increase their registered
and paid-up capital. This is aimed at
easing their liquidity problems and
writing off non-performing loans
(NPL). By this solution, the companies
are expected to continue their business
and gradually pull themselves out of the
trouble. In addition, alliances with
recognisable foreign financial
institutions can help gain credibility and
public confidence, which is one of the
most critical factors to keep the
business running.
However, the solution requires a
huge amount of capital and
commitment from foreign partners who
also do not want to take risks
themselves. Therefore, there must be
sufficient incentives for foreign firms.
The regular non-equity or minority
alliance relationships may not be
enough in this respect. Foreign firms
wish to ensure that there is considerable
long-term compensation worth their
risky investment in the TFEs. Most of
the TFEs then start to offer foreign
firms greater advantages, in terms of
managerial and ownership control.
TFEs, which have already formalised
their relationships with foreign partners,
tend to strengthen their collaborations
and are highly likely to allow the
foreign firms to take a majority stake in
their companies. In this case, the
foreign firms could upgrade themselves
from strategic partners to be major
shareholders. The alliance relationship
would become the “take over” in this
respect. In cases when TFEs have never
tied up with any foreign firms, the
relationships are likely to start with
acquisition or taking over rather than
alliance co-operation as in the past. This
is to attract foreign firms and ensure
that they will have enough power to
monitor and control their investment.
This also can guarantee the long-term
return of foreign firms when the Thai
financial industry recovers in the future.
In return, the TFE are able to survive
and continue their operations. Although
their previous shareholders will lose
their power of control, their businesses
remain in the industry and will not be
liquidated.
.
With respect to the regulations
concerning the relationships between
TFEs and foreign firms , it is evident
that the regulations have been
dramatically affected by the financial
crisis. Before the crisis, the regulators,
SEC (Securities and Exchange
Commission) and the Bank of Thailand,
usually exercise regulatory power and
launch strict rules to closely monitor the
relationships. This is to prevent TFEs
from foreign partners’ domination and
wish the TFEs to achieve the most
possible benefits. However, after the
financial crisis happened, the positive
business atmosphere turn out to be
worse than ever anticipated. Survival
becomes the first priority for TFEs. The
relevant regulations must be relaxed in
order to facilitate negotiation between
TFEs and foreign firms. In this case, the
regulators can not focus heavily on the
benefits for TFEs. The interests of
foreign firms must also be significantly
taken into consideration. The major
rules associated with protection of
majority ownership of Thai partners
have to be lifted. The regulations on
technology transfer and TFEs’ long-
term benefits from cross-border
partnerships are also relaxed. More
flexible rules are applied and various
conditions of cross-border relationships
are considered case-by-case. This
reflects the increased bargaining power
of foreigners.
Further, the regulators must change
their roles to become more supportive
in order to promote the establishment of
permanent cross-border linkages. They
are more likely to play “facilitating
roles” in order to encourage TFEs to
ally or merge themselves with foreign
financial firms. However, as the present
situation is considered to be the difficult
time for the industry and the whole
country, foreign firms seem to hesitate
to start intensive relationships with
TFEs. The regulators sometimes have
to be a negotiator or a match-maker for
TFEs so as to give more confidence to
foreign firms and to increase more
opportunities to complete alliance
deals.
Regarding foreign firms , it is
clear that the recent financial crisis of
Thailand has turned out to provide huge
business opportunities for foreigners,
particularly those from western
countries. The devastating impacts of
the crisis automatically force TFEs to
depend heavily upon foreign partners.
The firms need immediate help and
considerable contributions from
foreigners in order to handle the
financial hardship. This widens the
windows of opportunities for foreign
firms and results in their stronger
negotiating power. As both public and
private sectors realise that permanent
and intensive relationships with wealthy
foreign partners are the key solution for
Thailand’s financial economic
recovery, the financial industry has
been more liberalized by the Thai
government. Foreign firms then have
more power of control over the industry
than ever before.
In general, the major aim of foreign
firms is to have a long-term foothold
and a business base in Thailand. From
the impacts of the crisis, foreign firms
are able to accomplish their purpose
more easily and with less amount of
effort. In this respect, they do not need
establish their own branches or
subsidiaries. They also can acquire
domestic business networks and local
expertise immediately. Operational
risks and an amount of initial
investment are substantially reduced.
However, the crisis also negatively
affects the overall prospects of the
financial industry. The industry and the
country as a whole remain in trouble
and have to pass difficult stages of
rejuvenation and correction. Foreign
firms then have to turn their attention to
focus on medium and long-term
benefits instead. Nonetheless, the Thai
economy has started to show positive
signs of recovery and is anticipated to
recover in a couple of years. Foreign
firms can expect to obtain a huge
amount of benefits in the future when
the business cycle is in the rising stage
again.
Further, as foreign firms are in a
favourable bargaining position,
compared with TFEs, they are able to
select types of international co-
operation that can offer them the most
long-term benefits. Foreign firms are
highly likely to acquire the majority of
control and take over TFEs, rather than
engage in alliances or partnerships. This
situation is indeed favourable to foreign
firms as the market prices of TFE’s
stock are relatively low. Furthermore,
they still have considerable benefits
from the depreciation of the Thai
currency. Therefore, the acquisition in
this case is highly cost justified.
However, there are some foreign
financial firms that have been badly
affected by the devastating impacts,
particularly those whose main
operations are in Asian region. In this
case, the firms have no available
resources to acquire or help Thai
partners. Their first priority is their own
survival. Therefore, the termination of
cross-border alliances between TFEs
and these foreign firms are likely to
take place.
Concluding Remarks
This study is centred on the
formation framework of international
strategic alliances of Thai financial
enterprises (TFEs). The three major
points, including motives, criteria, and
timing, of the issue have been
investigated. This study looks at the
international alliance phenomenon of
the Thai financial industry during the
introductory and growth period. In this
respect, TFEs’ cross-border alliances
are mainly formed as minority-equity
alliances. The major areas of the co-
operation  involve customer services
and securities trading co-operation,
investment banking and corporate
finance co-operation, and research
technique co-operation. The
nationalities of TFEs’ foreign partners
include European, American, Hong
Kong, Japanese, and Singaporean
companies.
TFEs pay significant attention to
both approaches to alliances motives,
consisting of defensive and offensive
approaches together with market and
resource perspective motives. The
partner selection criteria most focused
on by TFEs include synergy and
complementary competencies. They
also concentrate on the longevity of
their co-operation by regarding the fit
and balance of strategic intent as well as
operational cultural compatibility as
important criteria. Moreover, TFEs
prefer to choose the alliance timing
when their industry is attractive to
foreign partners and when their overall
competitive positions are relatively
strong. The major reasons influencing
timing involve substantial marketing
benefits and a significant amount of
resources to be transferred from their
prospective foreign partners. In
addition, the shortage of eligible foreign
partners and forces from external
threats also affect the timing selection.
So far, the performance of TFEs’
alliances is satisfactory. However, their
alliances remain in significant need of
improvement, in terms of technology
transfer, fair alliance contracts,
communication efficiency, and sincerity
and trust among partners.
The frameworks obtained from the
research can well represent the
international strategic alliances of
emerging countries, whose various
economic conditions are similar and are
being developed towards the
globalisation era, particularly in the
introductory and growth periods of the
industry. Additionally, the results could
be used as a database for future
business implications and research for
business firms with high uncertainty,
especially in the Asian nations.
In the next stage of development,
TFEs’ international strategic alliances
would be changed. The alliances would
be mainly formed as equity links,
including minority-equity and joint
venture. Foreign counterparts could
have greater access to the Thai financial
industry on account of relaxed
regulation barriers. In particular, after
the financial crisis, most TFEs hardly
stay independent as they will be in great 
need of capital to reverse their 
financially ailing positions. The TFEs 
would be mainly taken over by their 
foreign partners. The tighter 
relationships, in the form of merger and 
acquisition, may increasingly appear in 
the industry. Various strategic thoughts 
related to alliances should be developed 
and would be intriguing to study.
***
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